In a liability problem, the asset value of an insolvent firm must be distributed among the creditors and the firm itself, when the firm has some freedom in negotiating with the creditors. We model the negotiations using cooperative game theory and analyze the Shapley value to resolve such liability problems. We establish three main monotonicity properties of the Shapley value. First, creditors can only benefit from the increase in their claims or of the asset value. Second, the firm can only benefit from the increase of a claim but can end up with more or with less if the asset value increases, depending on the configuration of small and large liabilities. Third, creditors with larger claims benefit more from the increase of the asset value. Even though liability games are constant-sum games and we show that the Shapley value can be calculated directly from a liability problem, we prove that calculating the Shapley payoff to the firm is NP-hard.

MT-DP – 2019/24
Olga Takács – János Vincze
The gender pay gap in Hungary: new results with a new methodology

MT-DP – 2019/23
Olga Takács – János Vincze
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition with recursive  tree-based methods: a technical note

MT-DP – 2019/21
Havas Attila
Measurement of innovation: the use and misuse of indicators and scoreboards

The choice of indicators to measure innovation processes and assess performance is of vital significance. This paper argues that those economic theories give a more accurate, more reliable account of innovation activities that follow a broad approach of innovation, that is, consider all knowledge-intensive activities leading to new products (goods or services), processes, business models, as well as new organisational and managerial solutions, and thus take into account various types, forms and sources of knowledge exploited for innovation by all sorts of actors in all economic sectors. In contrast, the narrow approach to innovation focuses on the so-called high-tech goods and sectors. The broad approach is needed to collect data and other types of information, on which sound theories can be built and reliable and comprehensive analyses of innovation activities can be offered to decision-makers to underpin public policies and company strategies.

MT-DP – 2019/16
Dániel Baksa – István Kónya
Convergence, productivity and debt:  the case of Hungary

MT-DP – 2019/15
Haris Aziz – Ágnes Cseh
Optimal Kidney Exchange with Immunosuppressants

MT-DP – 2019/14
Tamás Solymosi
Weighted nucleoli and dually essential coalitions (extended version)

MTDP – 2019/13
László Lőrincz – Brigitta Németh
Network Effects in Internal Migration

MTDP – 2019/12
György Molnár – Attila Havas
Escaping from the poverty trap with social innovation: a social microcredit programme in Hungary

MTDP – 2019/11
Hubert János Kiss – Alfonso Rosa-Garcia – Vita Zhukova
Coopetition in group contest

MTDP – 2019/9
Anikó Bíró –  Dániel Prinz
Healthcare Spending Inequality: Evidence from Hungarian Administrative Data

MTDP – 2019/8
Anikó Bíró – Péter Elek
Job loss, disability insurance and health expenditures