On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games by Ata ATAY and Tamás SOLYMOSI was published in Economics Letters.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176518301137
We study a special three-sided matching game, the so-called supplier-firm-buyer game, in which buyers and sellers (suppliers) trade indirectly through middlemen (firms). Stuart (1997) showed that all supplier-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and Maschler, 1967), and also with the Mas-Colell bargaining set (Mas-Colell, 1989).
Challenging Science and Innovation Policy Utrecht, 1-3 June 2022, hosted by Copernicus Institute of Sustainable Development, Utrecht University The “European Forum for Studies ... Read More »
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